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ABSTRACT 
U.S. financial regulators are considering exempting foreign 
government obligations from the Volcker Rule’s prohibition on 
proprietary trading.  Bank Holding Company Act § 13(d)(1)(J), 
added by Section 619 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, governs such exemptions and sets a very 
high standard for regulators seeking to utilize them.  This provision 
requires that four regulatory agencies unanimously agree to the 
exemption and determine that it satisfies a strict substantive 
standard—that it “promote[s] and protect[s] the safety and soundness 
of the banking entity and the financial stability of the United 
States.”1 
Regulators may jointly agree to make such an exemption for 
sovereign debt because they are facing intense political pressure to 
do so.  Foreign governments, including several close allies of the 
United States, have spoken out publicly against the Volcker Rule. 
These governments are asking U.S. regulators to exempt sovereign 
debt from the trading prohibitions of the Volcker Rule because of the 
adverse effects it will have on their debt markets.  Their concerns 
support the case that the substantive standard in § 13(d)(1)(J) is 
satisfied. 
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 1. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J) (2006). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress enacted the Volcker Rule in § 619 of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”).2  
The Volcker Rule prohibits proprietary trading by federally-insured 
depository institutions and sets capital and quantitative limits on 
proprietary trading by nonbank financial companies supervised by the 
Federal Reserve Board.3  It also contains limited exceptions to the ban 
on proprietary trading, permitting trading in government securities, 
trading in connection with market-making activities, and trading on 
behalf of customers.4  Importantly, Congress did not include foreign 
																																																																																																																																
 2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 619, 124 Stat. 1376, 1617–32 (2010).  The Volcker Rule is set out in section 
13 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1851 (2006). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A)–(D).  The Volcker Rule also permits certain 
risk-mitigating hedging. See id. § 1851(d)(1)(C). 
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government obligations in the government securities exemption.5  As a 
result, U.S. banks may not proprietarily trade in foreign sovereign debt.  
Foreign governments, worried that the rule will restrict their ability to 
raise capital in public markets, are asking regulators to make an 
exception for sovereign debt.  One possible avenue for creating this 
exception is a provision within the Volcker Rule allowing regulators to 
exempt additional activities from the prohibition on proprietary trading, 
if the activities meet certain requirements.6 
Congress granted regulators the authority to exempt activities from 
the Volcker Rule in subsection 13(d)(1)(J) of the Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956.7  In order for regulators—the Commodities 
Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”), Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”), Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency (“OCC”), and Federal Reserve Board (collectively, the 
“Agencies”)—to exempt an activity, they must first agree on what 
activity to exempt.8  Further, that activity must be one that “would 
promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity and 
the financial stability of the United States.”9  Many foreign governments 
have submitted public comment letters asking the Agencies to exercise 
their authority under § 13(d)(1)(J) to exempt foreign government 
obligations.  The statute itself does not explicitly say when the Agencies 
should use their exemptive power, nor does it distinguish between 
banned and permitted activities.  As a result, the Agencies face the 
																																																																																																																																
 5. Congress did however, exempt U.S. federal and state obligations. See id. § 
1851(d)(1)(A). 
 6. Id. § 1851(d)(1)(J). 
 7. Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 619, § 13(d)(1)(J), 124 Stat. 1376, 
1626. 
 8. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J). Section 13(d)(1)(J) applies to “banking entities,” 
which is defined in § 13(h)(1) as “any insured depository institution, any company that 
controls an insured depository institution, or that is treated as a bank holding company 
for purposes of section 8 of the International Banking Act of 1978, and any affiliate or 
subsidiary of any such entity.”  The term “appropriate Federal banking agencies” is 
defined in section 3(q) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (the “FDIC Act”).  Dodd-
Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, sec. 2(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1387.  The FDIC Act states 
that, in the case of any bank holding company and any subsidiary (other than a 
depository institution) of a bank holding company, the appropriate Federal banking 
agency means the OCC and the Federal Reserve Board.  12 U.S.C. 1813(q). Thus, the 
“appropriate federal banking agencies” for a majority of “banking entities” under          
§ 13(d)(1)(J) are the OCC and the Federal Reserve Board, as well as the CFTC and 
SEC, which are explicitly mentioned in the provision. 
 9. Id.  
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difficult task of writing rules that fill these voids.  The Agencies are now 
struggling to determine if Congress really intended to include foreign 
government obligations in the ban on proprietary trading. 
In October 2011, the Agencies released Prohibitions and 
Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, and 
Relationships with, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds (“Proposed 
Rule”), containing proposed regulations for implementing the Volcker 
Rule.10  The Proposed Rule seeks comments on certain questions, 
including whether the § 13(d)(1)(J) exemptive authority should be 
applied to foreign government obligations.11 
This article analyzes the substantive and procedural hurdles of § 
13(d)(1)(J) in light of the Proposed Rule’s legislative history, similar 
exemptive provisions in other Acts, and the ways that the Agencies have 
applied the section thus far.  It then considers whether the Agencies will 
exercise their ability to exempt foreign government obligations under § 
13(d)(1)(J), and how the Agencies are likely to exercise it in the future.  
Section I outlines the legislative history of § 13(d)(1)(J).  Section II 
compares the text of § 13(d)(1)(J) with exemptive provisions in other 
statutes to determine the strictness of the exemption standard.  Section 
III discusses how regulators propose to implement the exemptive 
authority in § 13(d)(1)(J), analyzes the arguments for and against 
creating an exemption for sovereign debt, and contains suggestions as to 
how the Agencies should determine future exemptions. 
I.  LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
Though there is limited legislative history for § 13(d)(1)(J), 
congressional intent can be gleaned from the changes Congress made in 
amendments to the proposed bill.  The next section explains the standard 
																																																																																																																																
 10. Prohibitions and Restrictions on Proprietary Trading and Certain Interests in, 
and Relationships With, Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 
(Nov. 7, 2011) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 44, 12 C.F.R. pt. 248, 12 C.F.R. pt. 351, 
and 17 C.F.R. pt. 255) [hereinafter Proposed Rule]. 
 11. The question reads: 
Question 122.  Should the Agencies adopt an additional exemption for proprietary 
trading in the obligations of foreign governments and/or international and 
multinational development banks under section 13(d)(1)(J) of the BHC Act?  If so, 
what types of obligations should be exempt?  How would such an exemption promote 
and protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial stability of 
the United States?  
Id. at 68,878. 
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that Agencies must meet when exercising § 13(d)(1)(J), then examines 
important changes made to § 13(d)(1)(J) during the legislative process. 
A.  FRAMEWORK OF THE FINAL ENACTED VERSION OF § 13(d)(1)(J) 
The final version of § 13(d)(1)(J) details the types of activities that 
can be exempted under the Volcker Rule.  These activities include: 
(J) Such other activity as the appropriate Federal banking agencies, 
the SEC, and the CFTC determine, by rule, as provided in subsection 
(b)(2), would promote and protect the safety and soundness of the 
banking entity and the financial stability of the United States.12 
This language presents three requirements that the proposed activity 
must satisfy before regulators are able to exempt it.  First, the statute 
requires unanimity; all of the regulators must agree on the activity to be 
exempted.13  This gives each regulator de facto veto power over all § 
13(d)(1)(J) determinations.  Second, the activity must be one that 
promotes and protects the banking entity.  The second prong thus 
requires the Agencies to make a factual determination as to whether the 
activity supports or fosters the health of those institutions taking part in 
it.  Finally, the activity must be one that promotes and protects the 
financial stability of the U.S.  On a macro scale, the third prong suggests 
that regulators must take into account the cumulative effect of all 
institutions that may change their behavior as a result of the exemption.  
To get a better understanding of the substantive standards in § 
13(d)(1)(J), it is worthwhile to examine the changes Congress made 
before enacting it. 
B.  CHANGES AND AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT LANGUAGE 
Original versions of the Dodd-Frank legislation did not provide 
regulators with authority to exempt additional activities from the 
Volcker Rule’s ban on proprietary trading.  The text of amendments on 
May 10, 2010 added the provision that first granted exemptive authority.  
It permitted exemptions for: 
																																																																																																																																
 12. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J). 
 13. In addition, the Secretary of the Treasury, as Chairperson of the Financial 
Stability Oversight Council, is responsible for coordinating the Agencies’ rulemakings 
under Section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act.  12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(B)(ii). 
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(I) Such other activity as the appropriate Federal banking agencies, 
in consultation with the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, jointly determine 
through regulation, as provided for in subsection (c), would promote 
and protect the safety and soundness of the banking entity or 
nonbank financial company and the financial stability of the United 
States.14 
On May 19, 2010, that language was removed and replaced with 
the following provision: 
“(J) Such other activity as the appropriate Federal banking agencies, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission determine through regulation, as 
provided in subsection (b)(2)(B), would promote and protect the 
safety and soundness of the banking entity or nonbank financial 
company supervised by the Board and the financial stability of the 
United States.”15 
The second draft required all four regulators to jointly decide on the 
regulation, whereas the first only required the appropriate Federal 
banking agencies to consult with the SEC and CFTC before making a 
determination.  The revised version effectively established more 
powerful roles for the SEC and CFTC in the exemption process.  The 
change suggests that Congress did not want to grant the exemptive 
power to a small number of Federal banking agencies. 
A second difference in the first two proposed drafts of the 
exemptive authority is related to the process that regulators must follow 
to make their determination.  In the first draft, regulators were directed 
to subsection (c), which instructed them to use the rulemaking authority 
in (b)(2).16  In contrast, the second draft mandated that regulators use the 
rulemaking process in (b)(2)(B).17  This change effectively eliminated 
(b)(2)(A) from the determination process.18  As a result, the regulators 
																																																																																																																																
 14. 156 CONG. REC. S3482-83 (daily ed. May 10, 2010) (text of Sen. Jeff 
Merkley‘s proposed amendment). 
 15. 156 CONG. REC. S3988 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (text of Sen. Jeff Merkley’s  
proposed amendment). 
 16. 156 CONG. REC. S3482-83 (daily ed. May 10, 2010) (text of Sen. Jeff 
Merkley’s  proposed amendment). 
 17. 156 CONG. REC. S3988 (daily ed. May 19, 2010) (text of Sen. Jeff Merkley’s  
proposed amendment). 
 18. Subsection (b)(2)(A) originally read: 
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would no longer need to consider the results of a Financial Stability 
Oversight Council study before deciding to exempt an activity. 
The next (and final) version of the exemptive authority made two 
more changes.  The final draft reads: 
(J) Such other activity as the appropriate Federal banking agencies, 
the SEC, and the CFTC determine, by rule, as provided in subsection 
(b)(2), would promote and protect the safety and soundness of the 
banking entity and the financial stability of the United States.19 
In this version, Congress directed the regulators to make determinations 
by rule rather than regulation.  Congress also removed the words “or 
nonbank financial company supervised by the Board.”  These changes 
are relatively insignificant.  What is important is that Congress kept the 
requirement that all four regulators must agree to the exemption. 
C.  RELEVANT REMARKS DURING CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE 
The substantive requirement for exempting activities from the 
Volcker Rule in § 13(d)(1)(J) is vague, only stating that an exemption 
must “promote and protect the safety and soundness of the banking 
entity and the financial stability of the United States.”20  It does not say 
when Congress would condone an exemption, but due diligence 
discussion on the floor of the legislature sheds a bit of light on this 
ambiguity.  The legislators’ only explicit reference to § 13(d)(1)(J) in 
the official record is a remark by Senator Jeff Merkley on July 15, 2010.  
Senator Merkley stated: 
																																																																																																																																
(A) IN GENERAL—Not later than 9 months after the completion of the study under 
paragraph (1), the appropriate Federal banking agencies, in consultation with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission, (unless otherwise provided in this section) shall consider the findings of 
the study under paragraph (1) and adopt rules to carry out this section. 
156 CONG. REC. S3482 (daily ed. May 10, 2010) (Sen. Jeff Merkley 
submitting amendment). 
That section of the draft was later changed to: 
(A) In general—Unless otherwise provided in this section, not later than 9 months 
after the completion of the study under paragraph (1), the appropriate Federal banking 
agencies, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission, shall consider the findings of the study under paragraph (1) and 
adopt rules to carry out this section, as provided in subparagraph (B). 
12 U.S.C. § 1851(b)(2)(A). 
 19. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J). 
 20. Id. 
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Subparagraph (J) permits the regulators to add additional exceptions 
as necessary to ‘promote and protect the safety and soundness of the 
banking entity and the financial stability of the United States.’ This 
general exception power is intended to ensure that some unforeseen, 
low-risk activity is not inadvertently swept in by the prohibition on 
proprietary trading.  However, the subparagraph sets an extremely 
high bar: the activity must be necessary to promote and protect the 
safety and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability 
of the United States, and not simply pose a competitive disadvantage 
or a threat to firms’ profitability.21 
Senator Ted Kaufman “urge[d] the regulators to construe narrowly 
those activities that constitute exceptions to proprietary trading to ensure 
that the Volcker Rule has some teeth in it.”22  While discussing the 
Merkley-Levin amendment, Kaufman went on to endorse the Volcker 
Rule because “[i]t would not give unnecessary discretion to the same 
regulators who have long had the authority to prohibit speculative 
activities at banks but never opted to do so.”23 
From these remarks, it appears that Congress intended § 13(d)(1)(J) 
to be used primarily to exempt low-risk activity that had been 
inadvertently incorporated into the Volcker Rule.  This objective makes 
sense, as it provides regulators with a quick and easy way to exempt 
clear-cut cases of harmless activity.  If Congress intended for                 
§ 13(d)(1)(J) to operate as a mechanism for regulators to prevent 
beneficial, low-risk activities from accidentally coming under the 
Volcker Rule’s prohibition on proprietary trading, then clearly 
foreseeable activities, such as trading foreign government obligations, 
should not be exempted at all. 
II. COMPARING § 13(d)(1)(J) TO EXEMPTIVE PROVISIONS IN OTHER 
STATUTES 
An examination of other exemptive provisions provides an 
interesting contrast to the above discussion.  Both the Exchange Act of 
1934 and the Commodities Exchange Act contain such provisions, but 
																																																																																																																																
 21. 156 CONG. REC. S5897 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeff 
Merkley). 
 22. 156 CONG. REC. S5886 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement of Sen. Ted 
Kaufman). 
 23. 156 CONG. REC. S3889 (daily ed. May 18, 2010) (statement of Sen. Ted 
Kaufman). 
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they operate very differently from § 13(d)(1)(J) in that they authorize 
exemptions in less extreme circumstances. 
A.  EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY IN THE EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 
Congress gave broad exemptive discretion to the “Commission in 
the Exchange Act.  The exemptive provision in the Exchange Act 
authorizes the Commission to “exempt any person or class of persons or 
any transaction or class of transactions, either conditionally or upon 
specified terms and conditions or for stated periods . . . .”24  In addition, 
the Commission may make exemptions “by rule, regulation, or 
order[.]”25 
Under this provision, the Commission can exempt a wide range of 
entities such as people, securities, or transactions and can issue such 
exemptions in multiple ways including by rule, regulation, or order.  The 
Commission’s exemptive power under the Exchange Act is further 
expanded because it has the authority to make exemptions of varying 
degrees.  By contrast, § 13(d)(1)(J) of the Volcker Rule requires 
unanimous agreement among five regulators, as well as fulfillment of a 
demanding substantive standard.26 
B.  EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY IN THE COMMODITIES EXCHANGE ACT 
Likewise, the exemptive provision in the Commodities Exchange 
Act (“CEA”) is much less demanding than § 13(d)(1)(J).  The CEA’s 
exemptive provision, enacted by the same Congress that enacted the 
Volcker Rule, contains a provision allowing the Treasury to exempt 
certain derivatives from the CEA’s prohibitions.  Under that provision, 
the Secretary of the Treasury ( the “Secretary”) may “exempt foreign 
exchange swaps and foreign exchange forwards from the definition of 
the term ‘swap’ . . . .”27  In making the exemptive determination, the 
Secretary is directed by statute to consider various factors before 
rendering a final determination.28  After making a decision to exempt a 
																																																																																																																																
 24. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(h)(6). 
 25. Id. 
 26. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J). 
 27. 7 U.S.C. § 1b(b). 
 28. The statute reads: 
(a) Required considerations 
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foreign exchange swap or forward, the Secretary must explain its 
determination to Congress.29  It must justify why those swaps or 
forwards are qualitatively different and ill-suited for regulation as 
swaps, as well as the objective differences between those swaps or 
forwards and standard swaps that are exempt.30  
Conspicuously, Congress did not give the Treasury an explicit 
standard to meet when exempting an instrument.  None of the various 
considerations Congress sets out are determinative; they are merely 
guideposts to aid regulators.  Thus, the provision confers relatively 
unconstrained decision making authority upon the Treasury.  Most 
importantly, and unlike § 13(d)(1)(J), the Treasury does not have to 
work in conjunction with any other agency. 
																																																																																																																																
In determining whether to exempt foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange 
forwards from the definition of the term “swap”, the Secretary of the Treasury 
(referred to in this section as the “Secretary”) shall consider— 
(1) whether the required trading and clearing of foreign exchange swaps and foreign 
exchange forwards would create systemic risk, lower transparency, or threaten the 
financial stability of the U.S.; 
(2) whether foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange forwards are already 
subject to a regulatory scheme that is materially comparable to that established by this 
chapter for other classes of swaps; 
(3) the extent to which bank regulators of participants in the foreign exchange market 
provide adequate supervision, including capital and margin requirements; 
(4) the extent of adequate payment and settlement systems; and 
(5) the use of a potential exemption of foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange 
forwards to evade otherwise applicable regulatory requirements. 
7 U.S.C. § 1b(a)(1)–(5). 
 29. 7 U.S.C. § 1b(b). 
 30. The statute reads: 
(b) Determination 
If the Secretary makes a determination to exempt foreign exchange swaps and foreign 
exchange forwards from the definition of the term “swap”, the Secretary shall submit 
to the appropriate committees of Congress a determination that contains— 
(1) an explanation regarding why foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange 
forwards are qualitatively different from other classes of swaps in a way that 
would make the foreign exchange swaps and foreign exchange forwards ill-suited 
for regulation as swaps; and 
(2) an identification of the objective differences of foreign exchange swaps and 
foreign exchange forwards with respect to standard swaps that warrant an 
exempted status. 
7 U.S.C. § 1b(b)(1)–(2). 
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C.  THE STANDARD IN § 13(d)(1)(J) IS A VERY TOUGH HURDLE TO 
OVERCOME 
Due to both Congress’ demanding substantive standard and its 
requirement that all four regulators agree to exemptions, the Agencies’ 
power to exercise exemptions under the Volcker Rule is severely 
limited.  Additionally, in contrast to similar exemptive provisions 
drafted by Congress in the past, such as the Securities Exchange Act and 
the concurrent Amendment to the Commodities Exchange Act,31 the text 
of § 13(d)(1)(J) does not offer the Agencies much discretionary 
authority to make exemptions.  As a result, the Volcker Rule has the 
potential to be inflexible and inadaptable, and may prohibit activities 
that do not threaten U.S. financial stability.32 
The incredible procedural hurdle that Congress placed upon the 
Agencies cannot be overemphasized.  Consider the requirement that all 
four regulators must agree to an exemption.  The likelihood of all of the 
Agencies’ interests aligning at once is slim and would certainly require 
extraordinary political or economic circumstances.  Given this burden, it 
appears that § 13(d)(1)(J) will be invoked rarely, and only in unexpected 
circumstances.  The havoc that the Volcker Rule could potentially cause 
to foreign debt markets is unlikely to qualify as an unforeseeable 
circumstance under § 13(d)(1)(J).  Nevertheless, the Agencies are 
proposing to use § 13(d)(1)(J) authority to make certain exemptions to 
rule proposals implementing the Volcker Rule, and have inquired about 
using the authority to exempt foreign government obligations.33 
III. ANALYZING AN EXEMPTION FOR FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 
OBLIGATIONS 
A.  HOW THE PROPOSED REGULATIONS TREAT THE § 13(d)(1)(J) 
EXEMPTIVE AUTHORITY 
An examination of the Agencies’ proposed exemptions provides 
context for how the Agencies might analyze Volcker Rule exemptions in 
the future.  In the Proposed Rule, the Agencies requested comment on 
																																																																																																																																
 31. See supra Part II.B.C. 
 32. Under subsection 13(d)(1)(J), regulators can exempt activities that “promote 
and protect” the banking entity and U.S. financial stability. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J).  
Interestingly, this seems to indicate that the exemption would not extend to activities 
that are neutral to either the banking entity or U.S. financial stability. 
 33. See generally Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. 68,846 (Nov. 7, 2011). 
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whether and how to implement § 13(d)(1)(J) exemptions in twenty 
separate questions.34  When the Agencies analyze § 13(d)(1)(J) decisions 
in the Proposed Rule, they use an assortment of unrelated factors that 
they apply differently in each situation.35   Thus, for each exemption, the 
application of § 13(d)(1)(J) depends on its own particular facts, factors, 
and analysis that are unrelated to other exemptions.  The Agencies 
suggest exercising their exemptive power to permit three activities under 
§ 13(d)(1)(J) of the Proposed Rule.   
Initially, the Agencies proposed to exempt bank-owned life 
insurance investments because they do not involve speculative risks and 
they reduce banking entities’ cost of providing employee benefits.36  
Allowing banks to manage and structure their risks and obligations 
regarding employee benefit plans, the Agencies state, “promotes and 
protects” the soundness of banking entities, and “on an industry-wide 
level has the concomitant effect of promoting and protecting the 
financial stability of the United States.”37 
The Proposed Rule would also exercise § 13(d)(1)(J) authority to 
exempt activities relating to loan securitization.  It proposes the 
exclusion of certain entities from the definition of a “covered fund”—a 
company that a banking entity may not sponsor or own under the 
Volcker Rule.38  The Agencies state that Congress did not intend to 
restrict bank dealings with these entities because they “do not engage in 
the type and scope of activities to which Congress intended [the Volcker 
Rule] to apply.”39  Central to that conclusion is the language in § 
13(g)(2), which contains a rule of construction mandating this outcome: 
“Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit or restrict the ability 
of a banking entity . . . to sell or securitize loans in a manner otherwise 
permitted by law.”40  In light of this directive, an exemption for certain 
																																																																																																																																
 34. Id. The twenty questions referring to § 13(d)(1)(J) are scattered throughout the 
Proposed Rule. 
 35. See infra notes 36–50 and accompanying text. 
 36. Id. at 68,913. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 68,853.  Specifically, the Agencies would allow a banking entity to 
acquire an ownership interest in a joint venture, an acquisition vehicle used to effect an 
acquisition or merger with the banking entity, and a wholly-owned subsidiary of the 
banking entity that engages principally in bona fide liquidity management services and 
is carried on the balance sheet of the banking entity. Id. at 68,913. 
 39. Id. at 68,913. 
 40. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(g)(2) (2006). 
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asset-backed securitization vehicles makes sense because they seem like 
just the type of low-risk activity that Congress did not want to include in 
the Volcker Rule. 
The Agencies offer an assortment of additional separate factors 
supporting the loan securitization exemption.  First, denying the 
exemption would cause many entities “to alter their corporate structure 
without achieving any reduction in risk.”41  Thus, for example, the 
Proposed Rule would use § 13(d)(1)(J) authority to allow a banking 
entity to obtain a limited ownership interest in an issuer of asset-backed 
securities.42  This exemption would permit banking entities to take on 
some of the risk of the asset-backed securities they are helping to issue.  
In addition, the Agencies state that retaining a minimum level of 
economic interest “will incent banking entities to engage in more careful 
and prudent underwriting and evaluation of the risks and obligations that 
may accompany asset-backed securitizations, which would promote and 
protect the safety and soundness of banking entities and the financial 
stability of the United States.”43 
The Agencies further muddle the exemption analysis by permitting 
banking entities “to acquire or retain an ownership interest in” loan 
securitizations.44  The Proposed Rule states that this exemption will 
promote and protect a banking entity’s safety and soundness as well as 
the financial stability of the U.S. because it will broaden the pool of 
potential participants in the sale of securitizations.45  The Agencies 
argue that this exemption is warranted because it makes it easier for 
banks to diversify their holdings and for individuals and small 
businesses to raise capital.46  Section 13(g)(2) is likely driving the result 
in this exemption as it prohibits any interpretation that would limit a 
bank’s ability to sell or securitize loans.47 
Finally, the Agencies seek to use § 13(d)(1)(J) to exempt bank 
sponsorship of a Small Business Investment Company, a public welfare 
investment, or a certain qualified rehabilitation expenditure.48  
Influencing this decision is § 13(d)(1)(E) that allows, as a permitted 
activity, “investments designed primarily to promote the public 
																																																																																																																																
 41. See Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,912. 
 42. Id. at 68,854. 
 43. Id. at 68,914. 
 44. Id. at 68,853. 
 45. Id. at 68,914. 
 46. Id. 
 47. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(g)(2) (2006). 
 48. Id. at 68,908 n.296. 
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welfare.”49  The Agencies argue that this meets the strict substantive 
standard in § 13(d)(1)(J) because it promotes and protects the safety and 
soundness of banking entities as well as the financial stability of the 
United States by “facilitat[ing] investment in small business and 
support[ing] the public welfare.”50 
In sum, there is no evidence that any exercise of §13(d)(1)(J) 
authority is related to any other.  The results are driven by provisions 
elsewhere in Dodd-Frank or are geared towards tying up loose ends left 
by hurried drafting of the legislation.  In some circumstances the 
Agencies are concerned with enabling banking entities to manage and 
structure their costs and risks; in others, their focus is on increasing the 
availability of capital to individuals and small businesses.  At the same 
time, they have justified exemptions as necessary to ensure careful and 
prudent underwriting practices. The application of § 13(d)(1)(J) 
therefore depends on its own facts, factors, and analysis that are 
independent of other exemptions.  Since there is no clear framework for 
making § 13(d)(1)(J) exemptions, the Agencies are free to consider any 
factors they deem appropriate. 
B.  ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXEMPTING FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 
OBLIGATIONS 
The Agencies apply the Proposed Rule to exempt activities that 
Congress overlooked when drafting the Volcker Rule or where there is 
an explicit provision driving the result.51  Neither of these justifications 
applies to the sovereign debt exemption; however, public comment 
letters provide persuasive justifications for an exemption.  These 
comment letters, many submitted by close U.S. allies, primarily discuss 
the unintended adverse economic effects that the Volcker Rule would 
have on their debt markets.52  As a result, policymakers are under 
																																																																																																																																
 49. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(E). 
 50. See Proposed Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 68,908 n.292. 
 51. See supra notes 36–50 and accompanying text. 
 52. See, e.g., Letter from the Fin. Servs. Agency, Gov’t of Japan, and Bank of 
Japan, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of 
the Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Dec. 28, 2011), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-78.pdf., Letter from the 
Fin. Indus. Council of Austl., to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 2 (Feb. 15, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-
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immense political pressure to implement an exemption.53  The comment 
letters only focus tangentially on the substantive standard in § 
13(d)(1)(J).  Rather than argue why an exemption would promote 
financial stability in the U.S., they emphasize the detrimental impact 
that the rule will have on their economies.54   
Without an exemption, foreign governments warn that the current 
rule will reduce trading and liquidity in sovereign debt markets.  For 
example, Canadian Finance Minister James Flaherty stated that the 
Proposed Rule “could severely impact the liquidity of Canadian 
government debt markets and interfere with the risk management 
practices of banks in Canada.”55  Although the Volcker Rule contains 
exceptions for market-making and hedging, the absence of an explicit 
exemption for sovereign debt will make trading in sovereign bonds a 
less attractive and profitable endeavor.56  Banks subject to the Volcker 
Rule that wish to trade in foreign government securities under the 
market-making exception would have to build extensive compliance 
systems to prove that they were trading within the permitted market-
making definition.57  The ban on proprietary trading, combined with this 
																																																																																																																																
11/s74111-345.pdf; Letter from Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Canada, to Dr. Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 2–3 (Feb. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-211.pdf; and Letter from 
George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer and Second Lord of the Treasury of the 
United Kingdom to Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. Of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys. 1 (January 23, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-
92.pdf. 
 53. The Agencies have contributed to this pressure by seeking public comment on 
§ 13(d)(1)(J) authority, and suggesting that § 13(d)(1)(J) might be applied to foreign 
government obligations.  See id. at 68,878. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Letter from James M. Flaherty, Canadian Minister of Finance, to Timothy 
Geithner, Sec’y of the Treasury 1 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-212.pdf. 
 56. See Letter from the Fin. Servs. Agency, Gov’t of Japan, and Bank of Japan, to 
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Dec. 28, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-78.pdf. 
 57. See Examining the Impact of the Volcker Rule on Markets, Businesses, 
Investors and Job Creation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer 
Credit, Subcomm. on Capital Mkts. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 112th Cong. 9–10 (2012) [hereinafter Hearing on the Impact of the Volcker 
Rule] (testimony of Mark Standish, Pres. & Co-CEO, RBC Capital Markets) (testifying 
on behalf of the Inst. of Int’l Bankers), available at http://financialservices.house.gov/ 
UploadedFiles/HHRG-112-BA-WState-MStandish-20120118.pdf. 
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costly regulatory compliance program, will reduce liquidity and affect 
prices in the sovereign debt market.58   The Finance Industry Council of 
Australia (“FICA”) wrote that “the Proposed Rules would have a 
substantial detrimental impact . . . .”  FICA cites concern about the 
possibility of “a number of adverse consequences, including increased 
sovereign funding costs . . . reduced liquidity . . . [and] inhibitions on the 
development of mutual funds and similar types of savings and 
investment vehicles outside of the U.S.”59  The Australia Bankers 
Association has stated that without the unhindered ability to trade in this 
debt, the liquidity of the Australian Government bond market will be 
undermined.60  Representatives from both Germany and Japan have 
echoed these sentiments.61  They concluded that decreased trading will 
reduce the value of sovereign debt and make it more difficult for 
governments to obtain adequate financing.62  
These governments cited another crucial consequence of the 
Volcker Rule; not only will U.S. banks be precluded from proprietary 
trading in sovereign debt, but foreign banks are precluded from trading 
their own domestic government debt if they have a sufficient U.S. 
nexus.63  Withdrawal of banks from these markets would eliminate a 
																																																																																																																																
 58. Id. at 10–12. 
 59. Letter from the Fin. Indus. Council of Austl., to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 2 (Feb. 15, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-345.pdf. 
 60. Letter from the Australian Bankers Ass’n, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Sec. 
& Exch. Comm’n, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 5 (Feb. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-329.pdf. 
 61. See generally Hearing on the Impact of the Volcker Rule, supra note 53; see 
also Letter from the Fin. Servs. Agency, Gov’t of Japan, and Bank of Japan, to Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 52, at 2; see also Letter from 
Ass’n of German Banks, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit 
Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 7 
(Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-157.pdf. 
 62. Id. 
 63. The Association of German Banks writes: 
Thus, even if trading in EU member states’ government bonds by European and 
German banks may, in theory, be eligible under one of these exemptions, the 
extraterritorial application of their requirements may strongly incentivize many 
European banks to avoid, or reduce substantially, their market-making and 
underwriting activities for such bonds at least when involving a U.S. nexus prohibited 
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massive pool of potential traders.64  Their departure could cause 
sovereign debt to become less liquid and more expensive to hold, which 
could further impede foreign governments’ ability to raise capital.65  Of 
course, these banks could claim that their trading in foreign debt falls 
within one of the Volcker Rule’s permitted activity exceptions, such as 
market-making; however, any trading in a covered security exposes a 
bank to expensive and burdensome reporting requirements.66 
U.S. banks may discontinue performing basic market functions in 
sovereign debt markets because the Volcker Rule applies to U.S. banks 
abroad, thereby threatening the functions they perform in trading 
sovereign debt overseas.67  Notably, U.S. banks are often active market-
makers in foreign debt markets, “serving as primary dealers, in several 
key non-U.S. government securities markets around the world.”68  The 
Bank of Canada stated that if U.S. banks do not participate in foreign 
government debt offerings, it would restrict competition and liquidity 
“and ultimately undermine the resilience of the Canadian financial 
system.”69 
Japan’s Financial Services Agency and the Bank of Japan 
expressed similar worries, but also stated that the Volcker Rule would 
adversely affect the role of Japan’s domestic banks in the Japanese 
																																																																																																																																
under the foreign trading exemption. This would not only affect European banks’ 
earnings situation by reducing their corresponding fee income, but also interfere with 
their efficient management of liquidity and funding requirements, for which such 
government obligations serve as a major tool. 
Letter from Ass’n of German Banks, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n 7 (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-
11/s74111-157.pdf. 
 64. See id. 
 65. See id. at 7–8. 
 66. See id. at 7; see also Letter from the Australian Bankers Ass’n, to Bd. of 
Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller 
of the Currency, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 
supra note 52, at 5. 
 67. Letter from Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Canada, to Dr. Ben S. Bernanke, 
Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. 3–4 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-211.pdf. 
 68. See Hearing on the Impact of the Volcker Rule, supra note 49, at 10. 
 69. See Letter from Mark Carney, Governor, Bank of Canada, to Dr. Ben S. 
Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys, supra note 58, at 2. 
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sovereign debt market.70  Specifically, they explained that Japanese 
domestic banks “might be forced to cease or dramatically reduce their 
U.S. operations, and Japanese subsidiaries of U.S. banks may consider 
exiting from [trading in Japanese government bonds altogether].”71  
Thus, there is a dual threat to sovereign debt markets—the elimination 
of the role U.S. banks have in those markets as well as foreign banks 
exiting trading in their home country’s debt. 
Finally, the comment letters note the unfairness of the Volcker 
Rule’s disparate treatment of sovereign debt and U.S. government debt.  
Under the Volcker Rule, banks are prohibited from proprietary trading 
in sovereign debt but not from U.S. government obligations.72  Public 
comment letters stress that this unequal treatment could lead to financial 
instability for the U.S. as bond markets become fragmented.73  The 
Japan Bankers Association argued that “[d]isequilibrium and unfairness 
could cause global financial turbulence, and the destruction of the 
supply-demand balance in the bond market could result in an unstable 
market environment around the world.”74  On the other hand, there are 
arguments against allowing an exemption, most of which are centered 
on the riskiness of trading in sovereign debt. 
C.  ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXEMPTING FOREIGN GOVERNMENT 
OBLIGATIONS 
Those who oppose an exemption for foreign debt obligations argue 
that banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation should 
not be allowed to trade in sovereign debt because it is too speculative.  
They claim that sovereign debt is risky and cite several examples of 
countries that have defaulted, as well as banks that have collapsed from 
																																																																																																																																
 70. Letter from the Fin. Servs. Agency, Govt. of Japan, and Bank of Japan, to Bd. 
of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 4, supra note 48, at 4. 
 71. Id. 
 72. See 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(A). 
 73. See, e.g., Letter from Ass’n of German Banks, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 54, at 7. 
 74. Letter from Japanese Bankers Ass’n, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Sec. & 
Exch. Comm’n 9 (Jan. 13, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-
11/s74111-69.pdf. 
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speculating in foreign debt markets.  Moreover, opponents argue that 
banks already have significant leeway under the current rule because 
they are permitted to hold sovereign debt as a long-term banking 
investment.75  In addition, banks may also underwrite or make a market 
in sovereign debt; the main limitation is that they may not proprietarily 
trade sovereign debt for short-term gain.  Senators Merkley and Levin, 
who had a hand in drafting § 619, say that there is good reason for this. 
[F]oreign sovereign debt instruments can be risky instruments.  In 
the aftermath of the collapse of MF Global, which was reportedly the 
result of failed proprietary trades on foreign sovereign debt, and only 
15 years after [Long Term Capital Management’s] collapse on 
derivative bets on foreign sovereign debt, it is troubling that some 
would contend that our financial regulators cannot set limits around 
such trading by our domestic banks.76 
Conversely, commentators argue that a comparison with MF 
Global is unfair because MF Global did not receive the same prudential 
oversight that a federally-insured depository institution receives.  As one 
comment letter explained, “[t]he lesson of MF Global is not that trading 
in government securities is risky, but that trading in any security without 
prudential oversight and leverage restrictions is risky.”77 
It is clear from the vast number of governments commenting on the 
Volcker Rule’s treatment of sovereign debt that there is immense 
pressure facing U.S. policymakers to create an exemption.  The 
comment letters contain a plethora of reasons why the current rule will 
negatively impact foreign economies.78  The Agencies, therefore, could 
determine that the negative global impact from this financial regulation 
poses a risk to U.S. financial stability and that an exemption from 
foreign government obligations would “promote and protect the safety 
																																																																																																																																
 75. Letter from Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin, to Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, and Sec. & Exch. Comm’n 33-34 (Feb. 13, 
2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-362.pdf. 
 76. Letter from Senators Jeff Merkley and Carl Levin, to Bd. of Governors of the 
Fed. Reserve Sys., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 33 (Feb. 13, 2012), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-362.pdf. 
 77. Letter from Allen & Overy LLP, to Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, and Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n 5 (Feb. 13, 2012), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-41-11/s74111-299.pdf. 
 78. See supra Part III.B. 
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and soundness of the banking entity and the financial stability of the 
United States.”79 
D.  IMPLEMENTING A SOVEREIGN DEBT EXEMPTION AND FUTURE 
EXEMPTIONS 
The Agencies are able to straightforwardly exempt activities from 
the Volcker Rule because § 13(d)(1)(J) does not require any formal 
analysis to do so.  In contemplating an exemption, the Agencies should 
seriously consider that debt markets are a critically important source of 
funding for foreign governments and that a rule limiting their use will 
hurt foreign economies.  Importantly, countries that would be affected 
are major trading partners and allies of the U.S.80  Thus, the impact of 
their economic turbulence would directly affect the U.S. economy.  
Cumulatively, this could endanger the financial stability of the U.S. 
In the future, the Agencies will likely only exempt activities when 
they feel there is overwhelming political consensus to do so.  It would 
be unlikely for the Agencies to unanimously agree on an exemption in 
any other situation.  The sovereign debt controversy is one such scenario 
because there is enormous political pressure from U.S. allies to make an 
exemption.  In addition, by seeking public comment on the use of          
§ 13(d)(1)(J), the Agencies are putting more pressure on U.S. 
policymakers and gaining additional political backing in support of an 
exemption. 
Henceforth, the Agencies should use the § 13(d)(1)(J) authority to 
minimize the global impact of U.S. financial laws on foreign markets, 
particularly when major U.S. trading partners and allies are affected.  
While this is a very narrow application, the procedural hurdle in § 
13(d)(1)(J) makes any broader exercise unlikely.  The Agencies should 
consider the interests of other countries who were not consulted during 
the legislative process.  Similarly, the Agencies should carefully weigh 
whether parallel rules implemented by foreign governments would have 
a negative impact on U.S. financial stability.   
																																																																																																																																
 79. 12 U.S.C. § 1851(d)(1)(J) (2006). 
 80. Governments that have commented on this problem include Germany, Canada, 
Japan, Australia, France, Mexico, and the United Kingdom. 
